Historic battlefields.

Welcome

Welcome to my weblog with which I hope to gather together information and thoughts (mine and of others) on the wars of the 20th century.

10 Essex website

I've been meaning to link to this site for ages, 10 Essex, the site of a re-enactor group representing the 10th [Service] Battalion the Essex Regiment.

More to follow.

BattleMaps software

23 April- St George's Day, a day to celebrate for those lucky enough to be born English! But also the anniversary [91st this time] of the astounding raid on Zeebrugge.

Contemplating this reminded me of something on my, recently re-established, computer- maps I'd started making of the attack using BattleMaps software. I was fortunate to be asked to take part in a trial of this product and even with my level of IT skills it has proved to be most useful.

A simple interface allows military symbols to be plotted on a background or image [see below] of your choice. Landscape features, including contours, can be easily created and re-used as a base for the map. The accompanying images are stills [produced by the programme] but to see the various phases smoothly cycle using the in build slideshow function is a thing of beauty. It's probably my lack of knowledge but I would have liked to embed the slideshow within a programme such as PowerPoint, or be able to use a stand alone player- but I believe I'm using an early version and this may have been corrected.

The above is a map of an action of the Essex Yeomanry on 13 May 1915, plotted onto the modern day Belgium NGI map. This is one of a number of phases used to illustrate the action to a local Western Front Association branch. A case of a picture paints a thousand words.

Don't just take my word for it, you can trial the software for 14 days before purchase, visit BattleMaps for more details.

First Blitz by Neil Hanson

First Blitz: The Secret German Plan to Raze London to the Ground in 1918 by Neil Hanson. Corgi Books [2009] PB 640 p.

The subtitle of this book is a bit of a misjustice. The book covers, and covers well, the German air bombing campaign of the whole war. The clear narrative focuses at both an individual and unit level, on the efforts of the "England Squadron" and others to break the morale of the the citizens of London and the corresponding British efforts to defence the capital. 

Covering the early phases, including Zepplins, the main thread of the book is the strategic bombing campaign [using Gotha and Giant aircraft] against London, it's surrounds and by extension the Empire's war effort. The author has skillfully weaved together the story of governmental, military and civic responses to this new style of warfare. The personal testimonies included in this book give a raw, often unsettling, insight into the experiences of both the bomber and the bombed.

More detail on the evolution of the Royal Flying Corps in it's efforts to defeat the invader would have been welcome and those who check the book's index for individual squadrons or locations before buying might miss out. My interests lie in Essex and many of the airfields/locations mentioned in the text were missed from the index or only listed once or twice.

The book concludes with an interesting consideration of the lessons learnt by the respective sides and their effects on planning in the inter-war years.

Researching first world war soldiers

The above is a topic close to my own heart but I have recently discovered [via the Great War Forum] a brilliant blog "Army Service Numbers 1881-1918".

The author is using his obviously extensive knowledge to help mere mortals such as myself get an insight into the mysterious arts of army numbering. With only somewhere in the region pf 40% of soldiers' service records still existing, data such as found on this site can be the only clue as to when a soldier enlisted.

This looks likely this will develop into quite a resource for researchers, so keep checking it out as more battalions are considered.

MGC photo

How Essex was the 10 Battalion Essex Regiment 1914-1918?

My interest in the 10 (Service) Battalion Essex Regiment [hereafter 10 Essex] was initiated through my own Essex connections. This has lead me to wonder how many men who served with the battalion were from Essex, or at least had Essex connections.

Without access to nominal rolls I decided to use the battalion's dead to represent the whole. Using the CD version of Soldiers died in the Great War a check of the born, enlisted or residence fields would/should reveal Essex connections. Only the data on "other ranks" was examined.

A second study identified days on which more than 10 members of the battalion died, with a view to identifying the most costly periods and giving a focus to the above.

Chronologically: [fiqures are: died/Essex Connections/ Essex men as % of total]

 1 July 1916              28/17   61%

20 July 1916             59/37   63%

26 September 1916 34/26    76%

21 October 1916     22/13   59%

31 July 1917           21/9      43%

12 August 1917      13/9     69%

22 October 1917     50/27   54%

21 March 1918        34/12   35%

23 March 1918        25/16    64%

12 April 1918          20/14   70%

26 April 1918          72/21    29%

8 August 1918         66/19  27%

23 August 1918       24/3   13%

24 August 1918      18/7    39%

21 September 1918 65/11  17%

23 October 1918     21/4    19%

Excepting the fiqures of 31 July 1917 and 21 March 1918 the % indicates the majority of men having Essex connections until April 1918. The rapid dilution of this fiqure is most likely rooted in the British Armies relative manpower shortage in infantry combined with the effects of the German Spring offensives.

Notably of the 16 most "costly" days for the battalion, nine are in 1918, with five during the "100 days" offensives. Whilst 26 April 1918 [at Hangard Wood near Villers-Bretonneux] was statistically the worst with 77 deaths, 8 August 1918 [the first day of the Amiens offensive] was a close second with 67. On the latter the battalion was reduced to companies of 40 men, but was capable of being quickly reconditioned, seeing further heavy fighting as evidenced by the casualty fiqures above.

With the nature of it's "Essex" affilations watered down, the value of battalion level espirit de corps must have become more difficult to foster but conversely more important. Had the geographically imbalanced casualties of the Army's Pals battalions endangered the regimental system or was it purely the relentless turnover of manpower that created the "mongrel" flavour of a late 1918 battalion?

As always this is more in the way of thinking aloud than anything else.  

PH Hood photo

 

The RAMC chain of evacuation, early war experience to the Somme 1916

The RAMC forward units, as with most formations, found their arrangements in disarray during the early days of the war. During the retreat phase of 1914 the general principle of rear units evacuating those forward was dislocated, resulting in a breakdown in the evacuation chain. The development of static, siege warfare allowed this chain to reform but also lead to a major change in structure due to the rise of the Casualty Clearing Station [CCS].[1] Constant attritional flow of wounded, coupled with the development of the transport infrastructure, allowed a greater emphasis on definitive care within the CCS. Its static location allowed for a larger scaling of equipment and staff, and the resulting ability to hold patients for longer recovery periods made the CCS the venue of choice for surgery. The field ambulance role reverted to that of bridging the gap between wounding and surgery.

 

The significance of the

Somme

offensive of 1916 as a watershed for tactical learning and development of the combat arms has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. But there has been relatively little study of the support elements. Was there a learning curve in the RAMC? Warfare always leads to advances in medical practice, but as the field ambulance had been formed to correct a perceived fault in the chain of evacuation, how had it fared?

 

The

Somme

1916

Despite the horrendous conditions of 1 July 1916, the forward elements of the RAMC coped relatively well. As circumstances allowed casualties were moved down via, RAP, dressing station and onwards.[2]The sheer numbers of wounded in many areas caused congestion in the evacuation of casualties and impeded the advance of reinforcements.[3] The main criticism later aimed at the chain of evacuation was the lack of ambulance trains to remove casualties from the various CCS.[4] This combined with the relatively rapid transit of casualties from the forward units and the large numbers involved lead to the overwhelming of some CCSs.

 

Whilst the infantry, and to some degree artillery, tactics varied between divisions, the medical arrangements were fairly constant. The 56^th Division had been formed earlier in 1916 and took part in the diversionary attack at Gommecourt. During June 1916 the division prepared for its role in the forthcoming offensive, the ADMS issuing his orders for the division’s medical arrangements.[5] With four RAPs in the line, an ADS was established in Hebuterne, staffed by 4 officers and 110 men of the 2/1 London Field Ambulance. Another field ambulance was stationed nearby, packed ready to advance with the third [less a detachment running the Divisional Rest Station] in reserve.[6]At the ADS position [a cellar bolstered with elephant shelters] accommodation for 20 lying or 40 sitting casualties had been prepared. The plan for evacuation still reflected RAMC 1911, bearers evacuating the RAP to the ADS with evacuation being carried out at night. A separate post for the walking wounded was established, sharing a common route of evacuation to the area of the ADS. The only signs of alteration to pre-war plans is seen in the pooling of all the division’s ambulance cars under the command of the OC 2/1 London Field Ambulance.

 

This structure struggled but held on 1 July 1916, unable to await nightfall the hard work of the bearers continued day and night, reinforcements being sent forward by the field ambulances being held in reserve. By the time the ADMS completed his war diary on 2 July 1916 his ADS had treated 1911 casualties.[7]With ambulance cars not able to move forward of the ADS the work of the bearer divisions became essential. The physical toll on the bearers seems little appreciated, initially plans were made to relieve them after 48 hours.[8]The bearers had to fight their instincts following specific instruction not to run or jog with a stretcher:

 

“in case a man’s life depended on a tourniquet or the dislodgement of a blood clot.”[9]

 

As the summer of 1916 became autumn the methods of the BEF were changing. In this culture of change the deployment of the RAMC field ambulances was amended, unfortunately following an incorrect conclusion. Conscious of the need to remove the wounded rapidly, but ignoring the recent ad-hoc nature of reinforcement and reliefs, the bearer sections of field ambulances were attached forward to specific Brigades.[10] Aiming to increase co-operation with the regimental medical presence, it merely placed the field ambulance assets in small pockets. Whilst sufficient for removing the constant, but low, numbers of casualties incurred during periods of holding the line, the bearers struggled with the large numbers faced during active operations. Assuming the casualty could be reached, the ground conditions and the scattered medical resources made an evacuation time from RAP to ADS of four hours commonplace.[11] Despite the best efforts of the individual bearers men died during this prolonged journey. Many of the medical facilities found themselves having to dispose of those who had died in transit. After a five-hour journey with his casualty a bearer arriving at an ADS near Longuevel found:

 

“a pile of blanketed bodies, like Egyptian mummies. A crudely painted notice announced, “Deceased awaiting burial.”[12]

 

After the 56^th (

London

) Division’s attack on Leuze wood on 9 September 1916 concern over the time taken for evacuation prompted change. Again reinforcement of the active bearer sub-division by others from the division had kept the chain running. In preparation for future attacks bearers were detached further forward, eight being allocated to each battalion to reinforce the RAP.[13]As “nobody’s child” the bearer sections had to become self sufficient, something which hampered their mobility and therefore their role as:

 

“In a typical instance each of the eight ambulance men was carrying, besides his own equipment, some fifty sandbags and a shovel or pick, while between them they also bore four stretchers, four blankets, bags of dressings and the usual sandbag of rations.”[14]

 

The sheer physical effort of movement through the ground conditions and the distances involved forced the inclusion of more posts in the chain of evacuation. Whilst against the principles of RAMC 1911 this was a necessary evil,[15] with Collecting Posts [CP] and Bearer Relay Posts [BRP] appearing between the RAP and ADS.[16]These first appear to be purely a resting point and navigation landmark for the bearers, including some basic form of cover:

 

“Collecting Post. Near

FORT

SOUTHDOWN

say K 21 c. 25.60. This would consist merely of splinter proof shelter for temporary accommodation of patients and personnel.”[17]

 

The need for control of the bearers and possible re-assessment of the casualty lead to these posts becoming a dedicated stage in the evacuation chain. By October 1916 the same ADMS quoted above allocated 1 Officer, 1 Sergeant and 36 men to staff a Collecting Post forward of his ADS at Colincamps. These men could also be called upon to reinforce, or re-supply the bearers to their front in keeping with general principles of the chain of evacuation. In an operation order dated 23 October 1916 the ADMS of the 51^st Division is still placing bearers from the field ambulance forward, attached to the battalions, but by November these men, whilst often located in the RAP are back under the control of the field ambulance. In a “Report on operations 13^th-15^th November. MEDICAL SERVICES”,[18] covering the 51^st Division’s attack on Beaumont Hamel the reasoning behind theses moves is laid out:

 

“In general it may be stated that delay in evacuation arises from loss of touch between Regimental Medical Officers and Field Ambulance Bearer Officers. During the operations under review touch was not at any time lost and no hitch occurred in evacuation from Regimental Aid Posts.”[19]

 

The movement forward of the bearer officer and delegation to him of the responsibility for keeping touch with the RAP, allowed the field ambulance to return to its most effective structure based on its position as an asset of the division. Able to concentrate its resources on the point[s] of most need, the field ambulance, via it's bearer section, was able to keep pace with the battle. Wherever the RMO positioned his RAP the field ambulance personnel would find and clear the casualties. The movement down the chain of evacuation once in the care of the field ambulance had become more structured with the appearance of CPs and BRPs. With a growing freedom to deploy itself the field ambulance had evolved slightly during the rigours of 1916.

 

The 51^st Division’s attack on Beaumont Hamel effectively signalled the end of the

Somme

offensive of 1916. The British Army’s next main period of offensive action would be around

Arras

in April 1917.

---

[1] The Casualty Clearing Station had replaced the

Clearing

Hospital

in the chain of evacuation.

[2]See appendix 2 for a sample chain of evacuation of the 1 July 1916

[3]Famously during the 1 July 1916 attack on Beaumont Hamel, the 1 Essex and Newfoundland Regiment couldn’t advance through trenches due to congestion. The New Zealand Medical Services experienced similar difficulties during operations near Flers in September 1916, see Carbery,

Lt

Col

  The New Zealand Medical Services in the Great War, (Naval & Military Press 2004) p 201-204

[4]Niall Cherry, ‘The RAMC on the

Somme

1916’.

[5]TNA: WO 95/2938 June 1916, order dated 16 June 1916.

[6]2/2 London Field Ambulance and 2/3 London Field Ambulance respectively.

[7]TNA: WO 95/2938, 1 July 1916 1 officer and 1 other rank sick, 48 other ranks wounded; 2 July 3 officers and 3 men sick, 63 officers and 1802 men wounded.

[8]In contrast the ADMS 51^st Division felt 24 hours was the maximum with a minimum period of 12 hours rest required before redeployment. See TNA: WO 95/2851 ADMS 51^st Division

[9]

Imperial

War

Museum

[IWM] 8603 01/36/1 Brady

[10]See 56^th (

London

) Division ADMS operation order dated 4 September 1916 in WO 95/2938 and 51^st Division ADMS operation order dated  in WO 95/2851

[11]

Carbery

,

New Zealand

Medical Services, this is the time for one “leg” for the return journey estimated to take one hour

[12]IWM 8603 01/36/1 J Brady p 93-94 talking of ADS of the 14^th Division at Flers.

[13]TNA:WO 95/2938 ADMS 56^th Division operation order dated 12 September 1916

[14]Anon The “Second-Seconds” in

France

: The Story of the 2/2^nd City of London Field Ambulance (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne & Co Ltd, 1920), p. 32

[15]RAMC 1911 states the numbers of positions through which the man must past are to be kept to a minimum.

[16]TNA: WO 95/2851 ADMS 51^st Division. Operation orders of the first mention a collecting post in late September 1916, with four bearers being stationed at this post. By October 1916 the collecting post is a feature of the chain of evacuation. Mention of bearer relay posts can be found in TNA: WO 95/2938 ADMS 56 Division supplementary order dated 6 October 1916.

[17]TNA: WO 95/2851 September 1916 Appendix B

[18]TNA: WO 95/2851 November 1916 Appendix A dated 29^th November 1916

[19]TNA: WO 95/2851 November 1916 Appendix A dated 29^th November 1916 Para II

Expectations of the RAMC field ambulance pre-1914

Extract from my dissertation:

The field ambulance was born out of the experience of the

South Africa

war 1899-1902. During this period the RAMC gained valuable medical experience in the treatment of ballistic injuries caused by the new munitions and weapon systems,[1] but post war it was criticised for the performance and structure of its field units. The individual role and collective relationships of the RAMC field units had been judged wanting, the resulting delays in movement down the line contributing to a high mortality rate. In an organisation looking for change it is surprising that it was left to a Territorial Force Staff Sergeant to put forward the solution.[2] He suggested an amalgamation of the existing bearer company and field hospital into one unit.[3] This simple idea was well received and with backing from the higher echelons of the AMS and only minor refinements, provided the blueprint for the field ambulance.[4]

 

The field ambulance brought together the various elements of the RAMC in the forward areas. It sat behind the regimental establishment and forward of true surgical facilities, bridging this variable and challenging gap. It was immediately obvious, and painfully true, that for the casualty suffering the complex, multi-system trauma that modern weapons inflicted, any delay in reaching the surgeon’s table would have a consummate effect on survival.[5]

The RAMC training manual issued in 1911 [hereafter RAMC 1911] provides an insight into the expected role of the field ambulance during deployments.[1] With a nominal strength of 10 officers and 224 other ranks, the field ambulances of an infantry division, commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, each contained three sections. Each section [A, B & C] was formed from two sub-divisions, a bearer section and a tent section. The bearer section, with 1 officer and 42 other ranks, was responsible for the removal of casualties from, and re-supply of, the RAP.[2]The tent subdivision, of 2 officers and 20 other ranks, would re-assess the casualty, begin any necessary treatment and provide shelter and comfort whilst awaiting evacuation down the line. It was in turn responsible for re-supplying the bearer sub-division. Each section had a transport element attached of a NCO and nine or ten other ranks of the ASC. A batman for each officer and an additional ASC driver for the cooks’ wagon completed the unit’s compliment. The three-section structure had been chosen to provide flexibility in deployment, allowing the detachment of a section to provide support to distant sub-units of the division. The expectation, at least in the AMS, was for future operations to be the small scale deployments required in policing an empire.

 

With a high portion of the RAMC wartime strength being drawn from the reserves, clear instruction and guidelines were required to allow a rapid mobilisation, deployment and an efficient performance.[3]  Despite the British Army's traditional dislike for doctrine, RAMC 1911 prescribes the employment of the field ambulance during operations; whether during offensive actions, an encounter action, an attack, a defensive or even a retirement. Whichever of these is considered it is explicitly clear that the field ambulance was to be employed as a divisional asset, under the control of the Administrate Medical Officer [AMO].[4]It is possible this was due to the relative lack of higher formations in the British Army of the day, but the size and therefore position and role of the field ambulance didn’t radically change during its lifespan.[5]

 

Following basic military principles the field ambulance was expected to keep a reserve, therefore generally deploying itself with:

 

“ (i) the whole bearer division or one or two sub-divisions in advance; (ii) the ambulance wagons working between the bearer division and the dressing station or advanced dressing station; (iii) the last named posts, formed by one or more tent sub-divisions with the medical store carts and water-carts of the section or sections;”[6]

 

But, as per RAMC 1911, one field ambulance would only work in isolation if detached outside the division, the resources of all three field ambulances were expected to work together to provide the full range of medical facilities needed within the divisional area.[7]

---

[1]War Office Royal Army Medical Corps Training 1911 (London HMSO, 1911), Chapter 15, pp. 102-124

[2]The general principle of the medical chain of evacuation is that the unit behind is responsible for the removal of casualties of the unit in front. This is also the default for responsibility for re-supply.

[3]Only the Guards and Cavalry Divisions had field ambulances formed by regular soldiers

[4]In all war time documents seen in this study the role is described as the Assistant Director Medical Services [ADMS]

[5]The field ambulance has only recently been removed from the Army’s order of battle. It’s successor, the Medical Support Regiment has maintained the same basic structure and role, [allowing for advances in equipment], the change being justified by the more frequent Brigade level operations currently being conducted

[6]RAMC 1911 p 104.

[7]See Appendix 1 for a 1911 chain of evacuation.

---

[1]The Army Medical Services received their Royal Warrant in 1898.

[2]The Territorial Forces [later Army] has always been a key element of the Army Medical Services, accounting for around 80% of the current “war” strength. The relative junior rank of the proposer of the idea is the truly surprising element.

[3] In a lecture presented to the royal United Services Institute, Staff Sergeant Stapleton outlined the move to what was, in all but name, the field ambulance structure. For a transcript of the lecture, see Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 46 (1902).

[4]Stapleton’s name for the unit was not adopted and his suggestion of the merger as a means of economising manpower was reversed in the formation of the field ambulance.

[5]This is still considered to be true of most trauma cases, medical staff talking of the “golden hour” as an outer limit of time from injury to definitive care. There have been efforts to support this with the “platinum ten minutes”, this is aimed at pre-hospital staff and is defined as the time span from time of injury to evacuation from the scene.

Finally finished

I have now officially been told my dissertation has passed, and therefore I have successfully completed my MA in British First World War Studies!

I might look at carving my dissertation up and posting it at some point in the future, but my basic findings were flavourable towards the field ambulances. The structure and role developed after the South Africa war was suitable, [though stretched, tested and sometimes creaking] for the field ambulance's role of bridging the gap between point of wounding and surgery.